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We tell
the world about the world
Our mission is to further the promotion of liberal democracy and the safeguarding
of the environment by the actions of accountable governments. To advance this
cause we report, without fear or favour, the affairs of nations that are in
transition, their politics, economics, business, finance and human rights -
and we tell it how it is, consistently, calmly, and objectively.
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| Countries: Iraq |
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Posted on Friday, May 24, 2013 - 03:04 PM |
Summary: Final results show that Maliki’s coalition did not do so well in the provincial elections of April and in fact lost considerable ground. Overall fragmentation has increased, voters have shown some attraction for hard-line sectarian politics and Maliki’s chances of winning next year’s parliamentary elections are in doubt. In the meantime violence is reaching the highest level in five years, while Maliki is now trying to appease the Kurds, after his efforts to ease tension with the Sunni Arabs achieved little last month. Among Iraq’s Shiites there is a growing body of opinion which favours Kurdish independence – not out of sympathy but because without the Kurds, controlling Arab Iraq would be much easier for them. The realists among the Iraqi Shiites realise that they might not overcome a Sunni Arab-Kurds coalition. Add in the deteriorating Turkish-Iraqi relations and the prospects for the Kurds and Baghdad growing further apart seem quite strong.
Peak in violence
The on-going and worsening campaign of terrorist violence threatens to undermine Maliki’s image of being a strong leader; he is now saying that he will revise his security strategy and that heads will roll in the security apparatus. The number of those killed in the violence in April and May is now the highest in five years - although still well below the peak of violence of 2006-7. There is enough violence to make many fear that an serious insurgency might be taking off in the Arab Sunni heartland and a Sunni-Shiite civil war might be in the offing in the country as a whole. The situation is compounded by continuing street demonstrations by Sunni Arabs and the bitter confrontation between Sunni and Shiites in next door Syria.
Provincial elections results
The results of Iraq’s local elections are now complete and indicate mixed outcomes. Maliki’s State of Law party got about 115 seats overall out of 378, probably less than they expected and a loss of 38 on the 2009 results. Its former allies of ISCI got 80 seats, improving their position significantly. The Sadrists, increasingly hostile to Maliki, got 50 seats, which represents a poor performance. The now fragmented Iraqiya list of Maliki’s rival Allawi got 70 seats, but Allawi’s own faction won very few of those seats. Two hard line Shiite parties, Badr Organisation and Fadhila, also did well; Badr is allied with Maliki. All the Shiite groups which expressed support for the Arab Sunni protesters against Maliki did badly in the elections: Allawi and Sadrists first of all. This is in part because the protesters have been openly rejecting be-Baathification and have expressed nostalgic views for the status quo ante (positions which cannot be popular among Shiites and Kurds). On the positive side for Maliki, a list of pro- Maliki Sunnis (a fraction of Iraqiya) did rather well, but the majority of Sunni votes unsurprisingly went to Mutahidun, the main anti-Maliki list. Among the smaller parties, a coalition of secular groups led by the Communists has also done rather well. Maliki’s coalition wanted to gain control over the Shiite cities, but will instead have to rely of multiple alliances to run most councils. His pre-electoral alliances with a number of small groups has not paid off. In particular, he was weakened in Basra, where he lost 6 seats.
If these results are projected onto the parliament (elections are due next year), Maliki might well fail to win enough votes to form a new majority, although it is not clear who could take the lead in his place.
Reconciliation with the Kurds, or salami tactics?
Maliki once again showed that difficulties do not intimidate him. He raised the stakes of the confrontation with the Kurds by replacing two Kurdish ministers, who were boycotting the meetings of the cabinet in protest at Maliki’s attitude towards Kurdish rights in the production and export of oil. The ministers of foreign affairs and trade have been temporarily replaced by two cabinet colleagues. Probably in order to probe the intentions of the Kurdish regional government, the Cabinet decided to meet in Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. Many Kurdish MPs have voiced opposition to allowing this meeting and the reaction of the Kurdish authorities will be the litmus test of whether there is still some appetite for reconciliation. Perhaps Maliki has decided that he cannot fight on two fronts and that the resolution of the crisis with the Sunni Arabs has to take precedence over the confrontation with the Kurds. This is why many Kurds argue that moving towards reconciliation now will only serve to allow Maliki to squeeze his enemies one at a time.
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| Countries: Pakistan |
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Posted on Friday, May 24, 2013 - 02:31 PM |
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Summary: the parliamentary election gave a strong plurality to Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N and he will ally with some small parties to form a coalition. The PPP got a drubbing and the PTI did less well than expected. The PML-N is now showing an intent to focus on the economy and wants to bring some experts into the cabinet, allegedly. But some ‘noise’ indicates a resumption of the PML-N’s confrontation with the army, which does not augur well.
A PPP debacle foretold
In the end the opinion polls which gave the PPP 20 or so percentage points behind the PML-N were quite right. The PML-N got almost a third of the vote and just under half the seats, while the PPP with less than 15% was actually overtaken by the PTI of Imran Khan in terms of the popular vote (16.7%). In terms of seats the PPP did marginally better thanks to the concentration of its votes in Sindh; it took 31 seats to PTI’s 28. The PTI did not do as well as some expected, but still had only one seat in the previous parliament; it took most of its seats in the KP region, where its campaign in favour of supporting jihad in Afghanistan stroke a chord. Given the very weak performance of the PPP government in the context of deep economic and political crisis, the punishment inflicted by the voters is hardly surprising. The PML-N will now probably form an alliance with some of the smaller parties as the PTI does not seem inclined to enter a coalition. The PML-F, a splinter faction of the PML which contested the elections separately, and the small National People’s Party have already agreed to join in. While people celebrate Pakistan’s first successful democratic transition, expectations of the forthcoming PML-N government are muted, given their past record in office.
Sharif’s prospects
To ease power shortages in the short term, the outgoing government just ordered government offices to switch air conditioners off and advised officials to stop wearing socks in order to make their life more tolerable in the soaring temperatures of late spring. Can the PML-N do better than this? Some of the first positions taken by the incoming PML-N have created some surprise and seem to augur a new season of friction with the armed forces. They have for example stated that they want the process of normalising relations with India to resume from where they left it in 1999 (when they were removed from power in a military coup). Nawaz Sharif, the forthcoming Prime Minister, has also promised an enquiry into the Kargil operation (1999), which started a border war with India and could easily have escalated further. Finally he seems also intentioned in keeping the defence ministry for himself, a sure sign that he has something in mind. Soon the chief of staff of the armed forces, Kayani, will be up for replacement and there is interest for what Sharif’s choice will be.
Otherwise Nawaz Sharif is for now enjoying a honeymoon with Pakistani middle class opinion – even the liberals are willing to give him a chance as the best hope the country has got, after the greatly disappointing PPP government. The honeymoon is not expected to last long, however. Sharif is unlikely to do much to extend the tax base of the country – as a billionaire with roots in the steel industry, he pays US$10 a year in tax himself. But some argue that Sharif, as an industrialist, should do better than Zardari and his team, at managing the economy. Sharif and the PML-N have said they will prioritise the resolution of the power shortage crisis and have already a team led by businessmen working on a plan to increase the productivity of the energy sector, which has in theory the capacity to produce enough energy for Pakistan. In general the PML-N has promised to appoint a number of technocrats to key ministries like energy, or at least people with a technical background. On the political front, Sharif has long had a record of appeasement with militants and terrorists, which his region (Punjab) produces and exports to the rest of Pakistan. From Sharif’s statement, he is likely to continue along his old line of appeasement.
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| Countries: Afghanistan |
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Posted on Friday, May 24, 2013 - 02:28 PM |
Summary: 2013 is expected to be a year of weak economic growth, at a time when the country already struggles with the uncertainties of foreign disengagement, renewed Taliban military operations, and declining prospects for a political settlement. The outcome of negotiations over a US-Afghan strategic agreement is still unclear as Karzai remains hostile to conceding legal immunity to US troops, but for the time being the Afghan state remains well supported by the donors.
Weak economic prospects for 2013
The exceptional conditions of 2012, when a bumper harvest pushed GDP to a 11.8% growth, are not going to be repeated this year and GDP is expected by the IMF to lag at 3.1%, more or less in line with population growth. GDP growth is supported by the beginning of oil production, which reached 1,950 barrels per day in 2012 and is expected to reach 4,000 barrels by the end of this year, although the extracting company talks about 5,000 bpd. In 2012 the mining sector’s share of GDP tripled to 1.8% as a result, compared to 2010. The bumper harvest also helped in containing prices, so inflation dropped four percentage points in 2012 to 6.4%. The Afghan currency depreciated by about 8% in 2012, but this did not help exports, which dropped 5%, nor discourage imports too much, as they increased 5%. Weak demand for the afghani suggests a further dollarization of the economy, as individuals hedge their bets by increasing their holdings of foreign currencies. Only the strong interventions of the Central Bank on the currency market prevented further, strong depreciation of the national currency. The banking sector is still being negatively affected by the Kabul Bank scandal and total banking assets were down to US$4.4 billion last year, from a peak of US$5.5 billion. In particular, commercial loans are collapsing.
Spending on, but for how long?
The government is increasing public spending to the tune of plus 45% a year, a fact which is contributing to shore up the economy. Most of the increase has gone to the security sector, but development expenditure (mostly foreign funded) and salary expenditure have also gone up. Although the government managed to raise more tax, custom revenues have declined by 9.6% in 2010, causing for the first time in several years the fiscal sustainability ratio to fall to 60% from 65%. For the time being, donors continue to pump a rising amount of cash into the state budget, less and less spending money directly. This allows the government to increase spending, but for how long?
A renewed military campaign
On the military front, the selection of a new military leader of the Taliban in January is beginning to show an impact. Abdul Qayyum Zakir, despite some internal resistance, has been able to instil a new motivation and aggressiveness in his fighters and the level of violence is once again rising fast, after a steep decline in 2012. Now the rumours are that Zakir is pushing hard for a major campaign against Kabul city itself, but is facing some resistance due to his predecessor trying to resist his ascent. Zakir has in the meantime seemingly been able to stall the negotiation process, which he always opposed. The minority of Taliban who want to negotiate is being further isolated and risk falling into insignificance.
Uneasy allies
President Karzai has been persisting in his campaign of verbal abuse against the US, which is understood to enhance his credibility in negotiations with the armed opposition, and also legitimise him with a public often opposed to foreign presence. However, the risk increases of the Americans getting tired of his tirades; there is a faction in the Obama administration, said to include the president himself, which argues that in the presence of persistent Afghan hostility, the US should bail out of Afghanistan for good. Perhaps for this reason in recent days Karzai has sounded a bit more appeasing towards the Americans, indicating that their request for 9 military bases around Afghanistan after 2014 will be accepted, in exchange for appropriate security and economic guarantees.
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| Countries: Tunisia |
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Posted on Wednesday, May 01, 2013 - 09:58 AM |
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Tunisia
The Jasmine Revolution: Secularism under threat, Society in Turmoil
In April, Adel Khedry, an unemployed 28 year old man set himself on fire, killing himself, after twice trying to go by boat to Italy illegally. The method and the kinds of desperation on display were the same that were used by one Mohammed Bouazizi in December 2010. It has been over two years since the young fruit vendor set himself on fire with a can of gasoline in protest in front of his town’s city hall – Sidi Bouzeid - to protest the abuse he had received from authorities. That episode sparked a chain of protests and events known as the Jasmine Revolution. Not a month later, the president of Tunisia, who headed one of the most stable Arab countries and one of the most secure economies in Africa, fled the country in shame.
The Jasmine Revolution was the first of the series of socio-political earthquakes that shook the Arab world in the so-called ‘Arab Awakening’ or ‘Arab Spring’. Nevertheless, the only real legacy of the events of Sidi Bouzeid in 2010 is that unemployed young men have continued to use self-immolation as a form of protest because, in fact, more than two years after the sacrificial gesture nothing has changed in Tunisia. Indeed, the country is moving toward a darker and more uncertain future; the jasmine flowers having rotted away.
One of the most evident changes to outsiders is that Tunisia has adopted a destructive course, giving up the one aspect that previously made it one of the most modern Arab countries. After all, modern and independent Tunisia was led by Habib Bourguiba to independence and statehood in the 1950s and took pride in its distinct secularism. In 2010, Tunisia had the most advanced legally-binding women’s rights in the Arab world. The country, as envisioned by Bourguiba was so secular that he urged his countrymen not to fast during Ramadan; nothing short of asking them to go against the tenets of Islam. He described Ramadan as a reflecting the “humiliating backward condition of our country” in an interview with ‘Time’ on February 22, 1960. One can only imagine, what the Islamic world would think of him today, as Arab countries are starting to look inward, rejecting the secular political and societal experiments of the post World War II period and looking to faith in 7th century religious prescriptions as, ‘the solution’ – rather than even just ‘a solution’.
Bourguiba, who died in 2000, would be appalled by the growing influence of radical Islam in a country that along with Syria, Lebanon and Algeria, could boast one of the most liberal societies (if not free politically), in the Arab world. Today, the secularists are being repressed while the salafists or radical Islamists are flourishing. In the past two years, Tunisia has known political assassinations and discontent in the streets. If society has experienced a ‘tonal’ shift, there have not been any economic benefits at all. Tunisia is experiencing a time of unprecedented economic and political crisis, accented by the murder of Chockri Belaid last February. His murder has come to symbolize the failure of the democratic transition that was promised by the Jasmine Revolution. While the country sinks into political, economic and social chaos, President Marzouki - who has a provisional mandate to lead the democratic transition acts as if nothing is wrong, fancying himself a head of state and publishing a book on nothing short of "The invention of democracy: lessons from Tunisia." The book offers a ‘scintillating’ and very favorable account, for the intended consumption of Western public opinion, of the success of Tunisia’s coalition of moderate Islamists (the Ennahda party) and secularists.
Beyond the presses and the typeface, nothing could be further from the truth. The so-called moderate Islamists have launched an offensive against what was best about the Tunisia of Ben Ali and Bourguiba, as if to suggest that because Ben Ali, the dictator, was a secularist, then all that is secular is representative of the dictatorship. Marzouki, who claims to have brought democracy to Tunisians, met strong opposition in Paris, during his book presentation from dissident Tunisians who left their country for the former colonial power. Many have accused the Ennahda party of sinking Tunisia, through the violence and oppression of the Salafists, into religious obscurantism. Critics of Ennahda complain that the Tunisian revolution was gradually infiltrated by radical Islam through Saudi efforts. There is no need for conspiracy websites to realize the change. The signs of the obscurantist change are rather evident: Salafists now control some 400 mosques around the country. The ‘niqab’ is all the rage in fashion circles, even in the very modern capital of Tunis, where it was not uncommon for locals and tourists to visit bars and restaurants – even during Ramadan. Theater performances have been blocked, artists, intellectuals, journalists have been regularly intimidated by groups of young men sporting beards a la Bin Laden and armed with violent and quarrelsome religious rhetoric. Salafists who are as hateful of heretic manifestations in Islam as they are of other faiths, have even encouraged the destruction of Sufi saints. Meanwhile, the economy offers little solace. Tunisia remains in the grip of the ‘revolution’ mode.
One of its main industries, phosphate mining and processing, has suffered a major production drop in the wake of a year long strike. Other sectors also remain hostage to strikes and the demonstrations regularly feature violent episodes. The unemployment rate is high – said to be 16.5%, but likely much higher – and tourism is suffering, putting more pressure on what was one of Tunisia’s biggest revenue generators. In this rather grim framework, artists and writers are being censored. The Ennahda party has essentially been damaging rather than leading Tunisian society. Nadia El-Fani, a film director who has worked with the likes of Roman Polanski and Franco Zeffirelli, has been threatened with death and lives in exile in France, over her critical depictions of Islamic traditions. She has suggested that the Salafists who go around dispensing moral rectitude might even be considered Ennahda’s armed wing, the ones who do their dirty work, terrorizing the population, trying to impose the veil on women who are insulted in the street if not wearing it, attacking movie theatres, embassies, and blocking university lectures in an effort to impose obscurantist ideas.
The political system has reflected the growing list of societal grievances. Last February, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resigned after failing to form a technocratic cabinet as he indicated in the wake of the assassination of the opposition leader Chokri Belaid, Jebali’s own Ennahda, headed by Rachid Ghannouchi, rejected the new government, claiming that it is up to the people to vote in favor or against the current system. Jebali has tried to moderate the Salafists, advising them of the need for more compromise. The main issues now remain the formation of a government and the drafting of a new Constitution, ahead of the next elections. Ali Larayedh who was the minister of the Interior in Jebali’s cabinet has now taken on the prime minister’s role and formed a government that has not really changed much, leaving the relationship with the secular opposition in tatters. Ennahda appears to control the political process, approving or rejecting (more of this than the former) candidates for the role of Prime Minister thanks to its roughly 40% control of parliament. Much will depend on political stability and Tunisia's elected officials are hoping that a draft constitution by April and elections by December will help bring greater democratic reform. Meanwhile, the political delays affect the economy and the slow recovery of the European Union has caused a drop in investment. The IMF for its part is reluctant to hand over recovery loans until a firm political program has been adopted, even if a tentative agreement was reached on April 20. This latest self-immolation serves as a symbol of Tunisians’ continued frustrations.
The Islamist-Secular divide has made the task of drafting a Constitution highly problematic, accenting important differences over the very way society works; there is more at stake here than a constitutional debate in a European style secular democracy, where certain freedoms are sacrosanct regardless of which party is in power. The divide could even be exploited by proponents of the old way of doing things, that is to say the dictatorship, compromising the whole democratic process itself.
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| Countries: North Korea |
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Posted on Monday, April 29, 2013 - 09:32 AM |
North Korea: Guns – and butter?
April was an eventful month on the Korean peninsula. And as usual where North Korea is involved, the events and news were not good. The tensions and wild rhetoric described in NewNations’ last monthly update were ratcheted up yet further. These included suggestions by the DPRK that not only foreign embassies in Pyongyang, but also foreigners in South Korea – who number some 1.4 million – might wish to leave, since their safety could not be guaranteed in the now imminent war. In fact no diplomat based in Pyongyang is known to have heeded this call, and foreigners in the South were equally insouciant. Western travel firms continued to run tours into North Korea, though they had a few cancelled bookings.
All this was largely verbal, but there was also one tangible casualty. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), the last surviving inter-Korean joint venture, finally fell victim to politics after surviving for almost a decade, including through previous periods of tensions. As April ended it was inoperative and its future looked very uncertain.
Mixed signals
Meanwhile, almost unnoticed amid all the shouting, on the home front a quite different note was being sounded. As March ended and April began, successive party and parliamentary sessions saw North Korea’s only known economic reformer, Pak Pong-ju, elevated to the Politburo and appointed as premier of the Cabinet (the DPRK does not say ‘prime minister’), a post he had held before. There was talk of foreign investment, and even of more special economic zones – even while the sabotage of Kaesong was simultaneously sending a clear signal that investors should not touch North Korea with the proverbial barge-pole. Quite how the North’s young leader Kim Jong-un, seen as behind both the tensions and the hints of reform, imagines he can square this circle remains to be seen. As April ended the crisis appeared to be easing somewhat, but it was far from clear how exactly the growing tentative hopes of a return to talks rather than war talk, would be accomplished in practice.
It would be tedious to list every threat uttered by Pyongyang. Most were in any case widely covered in global media, whose attention to North Korea during April was much higher and more sustained than usual. (From long experience such media frenzy usually lasts no more than a day or two, but this time it went on for several weeks). Unprecedentedly, this writer was summoned to the red sofa of breakfast television – not the ideal format for explaining a complex crisis, really – on both major UK channels, no less than three times in ten days.
Bigger and better temple, now enshrined in law
The most recent hair-raising threats came on April 25. As usual this day brought extensive celebrations for Army Day: the 81st anniversary of the supposed foundation of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in 1932 by Kim Il-sung, who was just 20 at the time. (The real KPA was founded in February 1948, but the day and date were changed in 1971 as part of the process of myth-making, so as to root everything in Kim’s anti-Japanese guerrilla activities.)
Though a widely predicted further rocket launch did not materialise, April 25 saw a military parade as it often does. This was held at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, the mausoleum of Kim Il-sung and now Kim Jong-il, northeast of the city centre; normally the venue would be Kim Il-sung square in downtown Pyongyang. Built in 1976, Kumsusan was Kim Il-sung’s official residence in his later years. As such it was secluded, on the edge of the capital, and totally off limits. After Kim’s death in 1994 his son and heir Kim Jong-il had it repurposed and remodelled on a vast scale as a shrine and place of pilgrimage, including the huge plaza used for the parade. Shut for most of 2012 to install Kim Jong-il beside his father, along with some favourite toys – like a luxury yacht brought from the east coast; rail tracks had to be relaid – Kumsusan reopened on December 17, the first anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death.
You might think the message was clear enough already, but on April 1 the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA; see below) passed a new law and constitutional amendment on Kumsusan. Full texts of these are not yet to hand, but the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) summarised the aim as being “to fix by law the shining achievements made in accomplishing the cause of perpetuating the memory of the leaders and complete it on a new higher stage ... The Kumsusan Palace of the Sun where President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il lie in state is a grand edifice for the immortality of the leaders, a symbol of the dignity of the whole Korean nation and its eternal sacred temple ... The law on the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun specifies that its noble mission is to preserve and glorify forever the palace, which is the supreme temple of Juche, as the eternal temple of the sun of the entire Korean nation. It is the obligation of all the Koreans to regard the Palace as a symbol of dignity and a great pride of the nation. [The law] also specifies the state duty to spruce up the Palace in a sublime and perfect way ... and devotedly safeguard the Palace in every way so that no one can violate.”
The dead come first
It goes on: “Orders were also set so that Korean people, overseas Koreans and foreigners can pay respects to the great Generalissimos at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun.” No detail or expense is to be spared, including “... matters of establishment of special sanctuary of the Palace for its protection ... management of buildings... park, arboretum, outdoor lighting [etc]... It was specified ...that electricity, facilities, materials and other supplies needed for the Palace shall be planned separately and be provided without fail on a top priority basis. The law also set the duty ... to strictly supervise and control ...the work for safeguarding, eternally preserving and providing the conditions for the management and operation of the Palace.” In sum, “the law on the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun is the unique code for the immortality of the leaders ... it is the biggest honor for the army and people of the DPRK to have the legal weapon for the immortality of the leaders.” The level of detail is striking.
So the living can go hungry and suffer power cuts – actually fewer these days, in Pyongyang at least – but the dead divine duo must now never be unlit nor untended, by law. No expense is to be spared. (We are describing, not mocking. An article on April 13 in the Party daily, Rodong Sinmun, was headlined: “Law on Immortalizing Leaders.”) This fact, and use of the word temple – three times! let no one claim North Korea lacks a religion – is telling as to the regime’s priorities. Very recently, tour firms reported that Kumsusan will be closed again throughout May to July; perhaps for further sprucing up in accordance with the new law.
Wild threats
But back to the rhetoric. KCNA’s English press release – the point being, this is the message North Korea wants the world to hear – quoted Air and Anti-air Force Commander Ri Pyong-chol as uttering what sounds like a kamikaze threat. Saying that “the men of his force is [sic; KCNA’s English isn’t what it used to be] waiting for a final attack order to put an end to the enemies”, Ri continued: “The flying corps of a-match-for-a hundred stalwart pilots, once given a sortie order, will load nuclear bombs, instead of fuel for return, and storm enemy strongholds to blow them up.” Not to be outdone, Strategic Rocket Force Commander Kim Rak-gyom thundered that: “The DPRK's inter-continental ballistic missiles have already set the dens of the brigandish US imperialists as their first target and officers and men of the Strategic Rocket Force are one click away from pushing the launch button. If the US imperialists and their followers dare make a pre-emptive attack, they will be made to keenly realize what a real nuclear war and real retaliatory blows are like and their stooges be made to feel the taste of horrible nuclear holocaust.” Not many states talk like that, nowadays!
You might want to leave
There was a lot more like this earlier in the month, and indeed in March. But such currency tends to depreciate. By early April no one was taking much notice any more, so North Korea felt a need to up the ante. One tactic was to try to unsettle foreigners. This was attempted on two fronts, north and south of the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ). On April 5 several sources, including Russia’s foreign minister and the British embassy in Pyongyang, reported that DPRK authorities had contacted them to offer assistance in case they might wish to leave. None did so, and several – including the UK – rebuked North Korea for stirring up tensions.
Separately and publicly, on April 9 a KCNA headline read: “KAPPC Urges Foreigners in S. Korea to Take Measures for Evacuation”. The initials denoted the Korea Asia-Pacific Peace Committee. With black humour, or maybe none, it was this body (rather than, say, the KPA) which warned that “the situation on the Korean Peninsula is inching close to a thermonuclear war.” It blamed “the United States and the south Korean puppet warmongers”, of course, but added that: “once a war is ignited on the peninsula, it will be an all-out war, ie a merciless sacred retaliatory war to be waged by the DPRK.” Since “it does not want to see foreigners in south Korea fall victim to the war, the committee informs all foreign institutions and enterprises and foreigners including tourists in Seoul and all other parts of south Korea that they are requested to take measures for shelter and evacuation in advance for their safety.”
This unprecedented piece of brazen and irresponsible cheek was almost universally ignored. Lest anyone be tempted to make the North’s day by fleeing in panic, it was noted that the 1.4 million foreign residents in South Korea include 200,000 from China. Having already taxed Beijing’s patience to the limit, Kim Jong-un was not really about to start killing its citizens. However, a couple of US professional golfers did pull out of a tournament in the South, and a few young English teachers came home at the entreaty of families panicked by the media.
Kaesong feels the heat
In one area North Korea’s threats did go beyond the verbal. Like the refusal of foreigners to leave either Korea, the continued normal functioning of the joint venture Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC; the DPRK calls it the Kaesong Industrial Zone or KIZ) had in a sense called Pyongyang’s bluff. Inevitably, some in Seoul and elsewhere pointed out that the North might huff and puff, but it needed the South’s money: gaining valuable income from rents, tax and wages paid by the 123 Southern firms which employ some 53,000 Northern workers there.
Putatively angered by such slights – though one should never take either DPRK faux rage as such, nor the pretexts they adduce for it, at face value – North Korea acted. On April 4 the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (CPRK: another of the North’s ironically named bodies) threatened that: “If the South Korean puppet group and conservative media keep vociferating about the [KIC], we will take a resolute measure of withdrawing all our personnel.” Then on April 8 Kim Yang-gon, a senior Party secretary, visited the zone and announced what he called “important steps as regards the crisis in the Kaesong Industrial Zone.” There was in fact no KIC crisis until then, but the North proceeded to create one.
Kim declared that “The DPRK will withdraw all its employees” and “temporarily suspend operations in the zone and examine the issue of whether [to] allow its existence or close it.” He was as good as his word. Next day no Northern workers showed up, nor have they since. Their fate is unknown, but they can hardly be happy to lose what by local standards were good jobs in not unpleasant conditions. Evidently the DPRK state still has the capacity, as well as the will, to control even so large a group of the potentially disaffected.
Going beyond what Kim had announced, from April 9 the North also refused entry across the DMZ to Southern personnel or vehicles; those already in the KIC were free to leave. At first many managers, supervisors et al. chose to stay in the zone and look after their facilities, rather than risk not being let back in again if they left. The Southern government protested vehemently, while offering to discuss matters. But the North dismissed this as a ruse and adamantly refused to talk about anything: be it a resolution to the overall problem, or even the immediate needs of Southern personnel who were starting to run out of food, medicine and other supplies. Eventually on April 26 the ROK had no option but to call its remaining workers home. At this writing on April 27 they were beginning to leave, with a full pull-out expected to be complete by April 29.
Dismaying though this turn of events is, it is too soon to read Kaesong’s funeral rites. There is a precedent, and a potential way out. On the other side of the peninsula another former joint venture zone, the Mount Kumgang resort, has been shut for five years since a Southern female tourist was shot dead in 2008. That suspension was ordered by the South, after its investigators were refused entry. Though a complicating factor is that the North has since nominally confiscated Southern assets at Kumgang – a risk which now arises at Kaesong as well – one logical solution would be to trade one suspension for the other: the North could reopen the KIC if the South agrees to let its tourists visit Kumgang again. Admittedly that might be politically risky for both Kim Jong-un and the South’s new president, Park Geun-hye. But at some point and somehow the crisis, which already feels off the boil now, will enter a phase of diplomacy, and concrete ways forward will have to be sought and found.
Bae at bay
That may not come soon, however, as Kim Jong-un has bigger fish to fry. On April 27 North Korea again made headlines; this time by announcing that Kenneth Bae, a Korean-American tour operator held since his arrest in the Rason special zone in the far northeast on November 3, will soon be tried. As KCNA put it, using Bae’s Korean name and DPRK Romanisation:
“The preliminary inquiry into crimes committed by American citizen Pae Jun-ho closed. In the process of investigation he admitted that he committed crimes aimed to topple the DPRK with hostility toward it. His crimes were proved by evidence. He will soon be taken to the Supreme Court of the DPRK to face judgment.”
Whatever Bae may or may not have done – the rumour is Christian proselytising – the game being played with him is clear. He is the sixth American detained in North Korea since 2009, and like his predecessors he will no doubt be traded for something. In 2009 it famously took a visit by no less than ex-president Bill Clinton to win the release of the highest profile such prisoners, journalists Laura Ling and Euna Lee. If Kim Jong-un had not done enough already via threats to get Barack Obama’s attention, putting an American on trial should guarantee it. What Bae will be charged with, his sentence, his likely rescuer, and Pyongyang’s concrete demands all remain to be seen. But the playbook is an old one, and the broad script familiar.
Meanwhile, reform?
All of the above is tiresomely in character for North Korea, even if Kim Jong-un is pushing crisis to new extremes. Yet much less noticed amid all the tension is a puzzle. Even while uttering menaces abroad, at home the North’s young leader appears to be pursuing a rather different agenda: one which emphasises the economy and hints at reform.
We have alluded to such hints in several past Updates, and they continue. One was a meeting of light industry workers on March 18. Admittedly Kim Jong-un’s speech could have been given by his father or grandfather. Stressing the need for more loyalty and better science, it contained no hint that solving what he admitted were “not a few difficulties and bottlenecks at present” might require enterprise autonomy, much less markets. Still, it is striking to hold such a rare meeting, emphasising consumer goods, while fomenting international tensions.
Two further meetings followed back-to-back at the turn of the month. At short notice, North Korea announced on March 27 that a “historic” meeting of the Central Committee (CC) of the nominally ruling Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) would convene by the month’s end. It duly met on March 31. Ideologically, it proclaimed “a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously.” (In Korean the term, set to become a new slogan, is byungjin, meaning ‘progress in parallel’.) This is “not a temporary countermeasure for coping with the rapidly changing situation but a strategic line to be always held fast to.” Possession of “nukes” – KCNA’s word – is to be “fixed by law.”
For a regime where in reality one man’s will or whim decides, this new concern to set some (in principle reversible) policy choices in stone – whether it is lavishing funds on Kumsusan, or keeping nuclear weapons – by embedding them in law or even the Constitution is striking.
Consistent with this, nuclear weapons were described as “the nation’s life”, “not a political bargaining chip... They are a treasure of a reunified country which can never be traded with billions of dollars.” But equally, “economic guidance shall be fundamentally improved as required by the new situation [using] Korean-style advantageous economic management methods ... The country's economy should be shifted into knowledge-based economy and the foreign trade be made multilateral and diversified and investment be widely introduced.”
Guns and butter?
In introductory economics texts, the ineluctable need to choose was sometimes summed up in the phrase “Guns or butter”. For all actors – be they governments, firms or consumers – more of X by definition means less of Y. The fundamental reason for this, obviously, is that funds and resources are finite; so every spending choice carries its own opportunity cost. If you plump for X, or the more you spend on X, the less you will have left to devote to Y.
Kim Jong-un, by contrast, seems to think he can have his cake and eat it (to mix metaphors). Perhaps his Swiss schooling was deficient in economics, so let us spell out why he cannot. The reasons are several. In strict economic terms, first, guns vs butter is not a ‘both-and’ but a clear ‘either/or’. High nuclear and other military spending means few funds are left to invest in the civilian economy: a Cinderella which in fact has long been subordinated to the military.
The CC has an answer to that. It claims that nukes save money: “By ... decisively improving our deterrent and national defence capabilities without spending more on defence ... we will be able to concentrate on improving people’s lives and economic construction.” That might be true if spending were also about to be cut on the KPA’s huge and costly (but outmoded) conventional forces, but it is very hard to imagine that happening; it would be radical indeed.
Then there is politics. How can the WPK expect to boost foreign trade and investment, when the result of nuclear and missile tests is UN sanctions which forbid or discourage any foreign involvement? Third, ideologically, a militarised system stressing loyalty is hard to meld with a modern market economy where actors make economic choices based on reason and profit. The latter would never enshrine in law that tending to the dead, matters more than the living.
A reformer returns
The inconsistencies are glaring, yet Kim Jong-un appears to mean it. On the personnel front, the CC meeting elevated North Korea’s only confirmed reformer to full membership of the Politburo. Pak Pong-ju caught South Koreans’ eye when as chemicals minister he visited the South with an economic delegation in 2002, in the heyday of the ‘sunshine’ policy. Pak was keenly interested in what made the South tick, whereas the more reserved Jang Song-thaek (who was also on the tour) kept his own counsel, as befitted Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law.
In 2003 Pak was made premier. As such he oversaw North Korea’s first ever comprehensive if also tentative market reforms: the July 1st [2002] Economic Management Improvement Measures. These were never formally promulgated, and were partly rolled back after Pak’s dismissal in 2007. As someone close to Jang Song-thaek, Pak was never fully purged and he had recently returned to view as Party secretary in charge of light industry.
Now he is fully back in the saddle again. A day after the CC meeting, the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament, held its usual spring meeting. As ever, a single day sufficed to nod through a raft of predecided approvals, including a budget with no numbers (no change there, then). But the SPA also made Pak Pong-ju premier again. He replaces the loyal but ageing Choe Yong-rim, who at 82 must be glad to be relieved of what was an arduous round of provincial factory and other worksite visits. Kim Jong-il, over a decade younger than Choe, used to keep up a similarly punishing schedule, and the official account is that it killed him; he died on his train. Keen no doubt to avoid that fate, his son Kim Jong-un seems not to have a very busy workload and rarely if ever leaves Pyongyang.
What difference Pak as premier again can make in practice, remains to be seen. In the present climate of tensions, militarism is set to predominate. Besides, no government genuinely keen to boost the civilian economy and foreign investment would have made Kaesong a political pawn, jeopardising its present and future – let alone the chance of creating further Kaesongs.
Kim Jong-il never did that. When he raised tensions, as he often did, this was almost always carefully calculated and calibrated. His son by contrast appears reckless, and also incapable of either long-term or joined-up thinking. Even if byungjin is sincere, it is contradictory and doomed to failure. Guns and butter? As Eliza Doolittle might have said: Not b-----y likely.
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| Countries: Turkey |
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Posted on Friday, April 26, 2013 - 02:48 PM |
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Summary: The principal point of note in the past month has been a major moment in modern Turkish history: the declaration of a ceasefire with the PKK. Whether this declaration goes beyond rhetoric, will indicate how great a place the moment will occupy in the history books. Relations with Iraq are going from bad to worse due to a new oil and gas deal with the autonomous Kurdish Republic. A ‘breakthrough’ apology from Israel on the Mavi Marmara incident has, it would seem, as yet, failed to soften Ankara’s stance towards Jerusalem in any significant way. Erdogan’s ‘no problems with neighbours’ policy is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in the wake of the Syrian crisis, and the deepening rift with Iraq over the Kurdish region is a powder keg. Baghdad had at one point gone so far as to threaten military action should their rights to a percentage of the profits in energy exports from the Kurdish region be contravened, as they view it. Ankara has taken a serious risk in disregarding that warning.
The major event in the Turkic world over the past month was a new chapter in the history books – the declaration of a ceasefire between Kurdish separatists and the Turkish authorities, in a battle which has been going for nearly two decades and claimed the lives of 40,000 people. Whilst undeniably an occurrence of major import and the product of several months of delicate negotiations between the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the authorities in Ankara, the path to a complete end to hostilities may be long. It is contingent upon the good will of both sides and the realization of many of the Kurds’ long standing political goals.
On March 21st, Abdallah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, heralded the dawn of “a new Turkey”, saying it was time for “the guns to fall silent and for ideas to speak” in a statement read out by members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy (BDP) party to over a million Kurds gathered in Diyarbakir, in the country’s south-east. The ostensible culmination of a period of intense negotiations with the Turkish government that began last October, Ocalan proclaimed that this year’s spring festivities, Nevroz, typically a day of defiance, should herald a new era of “sunshine, with enthusiasm and democratic tolerance”. The media was awash with headlines declaring that “the war is over”. Murat Karayilan, a senior PKK commander in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, swiftly declared a ceasefire. Recep Tayyip Erdogan praised Mr Ocalan’s “positive” tone. Ocalan also ordered that four conferences be held, one in Ankara, another in Diyarbakır, another one in Europe, and another one in Hewler [Arbil], where all matters would be discussed and opinions expressed. This appears to be the first step. Remzi Kartal, a senior PKK member in Europe and a former deputy in the Turkish Parliament said in an interview that: "The necessity of peace will be discussed. Actually, you should consider it as a constant platform rather than a conference. It will not gather just once. It will continue gathering until the normalization days, which is the disarmament of Mount Kandil.”
The disarmament itself is not necessarily a fait accompli. It has been noted that no actual deadlines have been made for the Turkish withdrawal of troops. On the Kurdish side, there has not been a great deal of enthusiasm. Whilst the news of the ceasefire may have been jubilatory, PKK heads have subsequently resiled a little from the celebrations. Karayilan was also slightly less accommodating in interviews he subsequently gave. He has told the press that 'his men were as ready for peace as they were for war” and stated that the ceasefire needed to be mutually observed and was entirely contingent upon the fulfillments of promises concerning Kurdish political freedoms. Disarmament is, the PKK believes, the last step in the process. The Turkish authorities, however, would clearly prefer to see that come first. Karayilan has highlighted some of the logistics problems of disarming tens of thousand of fighters who live in the remote mountains of the state’s south east. Selahattin Demirtas, co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), has lamented: “He [Erdogan] says, 'Leave the weapons in a cave or bury them, do whatever you want,' but who will regulate this?"
Meanwhile, Turkey’s increasing friendliness with the neighboring autonomous Kurdish Republic within Iraq, has risked souring relations with Bagdad even further. Having astutely wooed Iraqi Kurdish Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani on several occasion in an attempt to find solutions to Turkey’s Kurdish problems, Ankara has now allegedly signed a oil and gas deal with the Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq without seeking Bagdad's approval. Turkey’s attempts to bypass Baghdad is a long standing bone of contention between Ankara and Bagdad. The deal allegedly signed in mid-April following a meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Nechirvan Barzani in Ankara would allow oil and gas to be directly supplied to Turkey. Turkey may also take the Kurdish government’s stake in concessions operated by Exxon Mobil Corp. This deal is particularly significant because it would considerably transform Kurdistan’s economic position, reduce its reliance on Bagdad and undermine the integrity of united Iraq even further, as well as cutting the central government out of large sums of petrodollars.
Iraq has consistently made its feelings on the matter known to Ankara and observers have concluded that this move will be deemed highly aggressive by the al-Maliki regime. On April 17, Iraq’s deputy prime minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, said that his government had made it clear to Turkey that it doesn’t allow oil agreements without central government approval, and that Turkey must respect Iraqi sovereignty. Erdogan's interest in sweetening the Iraqi Kurds, is, as aforementioned, part of his own political endeavors to tame the homegrown Kurdish separatist movement. The deal will also reduce its energy import bill by a significant tranche. The move is particularly worrying for Iraq at a time when the Kurdish movement is gaining strength due to the seismic changes in the Middle East. Syria’s Kurds are re-galvanising in the wake of the civil war. Others are concerned too. It is also expected that Iran might worry that PKK fighters reluctant to lay their arms down in Turkey’s South might continue to militate in other parts of the Kurdish world, Iran being one of them. It is particularly disturbing to Iran since its ‘Iranian Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan’ is looking to focus the Kurdish struggle on Iran.
Erdogan’s attempts to curry favour with Iraq’s Kurds, as well as those at home, are, many say, part and parcel of his attempts to run for President, which would be much easier with the support of the Kurdish minority. Some have even suggested that whether or not a ceasefire is achieved, the process of negotiation might be enough, is a cynical attempt to de-fang the whole separatist movement by creating a rift between Ocalan and the armed fighters in the mountains. This is one element of his attempts to gain Kurdish support for his presidential bid. These plans continue to stimulate controversy. On March 29, Erdogan used an appearance on a TV show to explain the validity of the Eyalet system, the use of semiautonomous provinces created in the Ottoman era. Fears that the Prime Minister is attempting to establish a neo-Sultanate, reinforced by his punitive stance on journalists and his consistent referencing of the idea of Turkishness, will certainly be underscored by this kind of rhetoric.
Another ongoing international dispute bubbling away is that with Israel. On March 24, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apologized to Turkey for a 2010 raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla. Whilst the Erdogan regime had, as a general rule enjoyed positive relations with Jerusalem, this changed dramatically, with the Marmara incident in which nine Turkish aid workers delivering supplies to Gaza were killed. This, along with Erdogan’s strong relations with Hamas in the wake of the Arab Spring, has deeply problematized relations. The apology, which came during a thirty-minute phone call between the Turkish and Israeli leader, was apparently accepted. It has been suggested that it came partly at the appeal of Barack Obama who has hoped that this problem be addressed. The U.S. President commented: “There are obviously going to still be some significant disagreements ... but they also have a wide range of shared interests, and they both happen to be extraordinarily strong partners and friends of ours […] So it's in the interest of the United States that they begin this process of getting their relationship back in order." Turkey also agreed to reestablish diplomatic ties.
Whilst it was, some observers noted, something of a breakthrough that Ankara accepted the apology at all, the subsequent transition to restoring diplomatic ties has not been entirely smooth. At the start of April, Ankara asked Israel to delay sending a delegation to Turkey to discuss issues relating to their restoration. The reason for this delay is Israel’s ongoing blockade of Gaza. On April 17, it was reported that Turkey had refused to agree to a meeting of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue group, which includes Israel and six Arab countries, indicating that Turkey is not willing to allow a relaxation of tensions whilst the issue of Gaza is unresolved. Erdogan's efforts to seal pan-Arabic nationalism in the wake of the Arab Spring (and his cultivation of ties with Hamas a trip to Gaza is planned for the end of May) is proving highly contentious for Jerusalem.
Erdogan’s ‘no problems with neighbours’ policy is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in the wake of the Syrian crisis, and the deepening rift with Iraq over the Kurdish region is a powder keg. Baghdad had at one point gone so far as to threaten military action should their rights to a percentage of the profits in energy exports from the Kurdish region be contravened, as they view it. Ankara has taken a serious risk in disregarding that warning. Regarding the PKK, one observer, Safeen Dizayee, a spokesman for the Iraqi Kurdish region has been rather prescient in commenting that “solving the PKK problem is not the same as solving the Kurdish problem”. Whilst an end to hostilities would be a landmark, the likelihood of this happening painlessly and quickly is minimal. The complexity of the Kurdish question and the different countries the diaspora inhabit make a quick fix unlikely.
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| Countries: Turkmenistan |
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Posted on Friday, April 26, 2013 - 02:46 PM |
Summary: Turkmenistan’s self-ordained ‘protector’, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, wields immense power in this oil-rich Caspian nation. With enviable gas resources (the fourth largest deposits in the world) the state has managed to maintain a secure geopolitical foothold, being wooed by Asia, Russia and the West with its exports and its involvement in the North-South corridor line since 2007 which will assure transit of freight from South Asia across to Europe and the West via the Caucasus and Central Asia. This wealth however cannot mask a striking poverty in rights and freedoms among citizens; particularly any who dare to question the regime.
Our own World Audit (www.worldaudit.org) ranks Turkmenistan at 149 out of 150 in the world in the democracy tables, conceding the absolute worst place only to North Korea. In its annual Democracy Index 2012, the Economist Intelligence Unit placed Turkmenistan a woeful 6th from the bottom with a score of 1.70 out of 10, to be followed only by Saudi Arabia, Syria, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and North Korea. This places it irrevocably in the category of authoritarian regimes. In the US watchdog Freedom House’s latest edition of “Freedom in the World” index, Turkmenistan was also to be seen in last place of the 47 countries designated as Not Free, with fellow rights offenders Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Uzbekistan. In that NGO’s annual report on “The World’s Most Repressive Societies”, Turkmenistan was named as the second most repressive country in the world, to be followed only by Uzbekistan. Domestic NGOs are virtually unheard of and those that remain, such as the Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation, operate in exile. It is in short, a monstrous regime.
That criticism of Berdymukhammedov is unacceptable in the nation is unsurprising, given the efforts which the President has made, to institute a cult of personality. Some of the protector’s antics would make even the most committed megalomaniac balk. The second "Week of Health and Happiness", an exercise festival designed by the President last year, took place at the start of April. The festival involves coercing students and state employees into physical exercise. This year's motto. "Turkmenistan is a land of health and lofty spirit,” indicates to some extent the timbre of the programme. The president’s attempts to install himself in every aspect of citizens’ lives are mind-boggling. His image alone is inescapable. A recent report from RFE/RL suggested that newlyweds are obligated to include the portrait of the president in their wedding photos due to the sheer ubiquity of his image in wedding palaces.
The dictator's personality cult also comes at considerable public expense. Teachers are obliged to make collections in schools for the new portraits of their protector. In March, in advance of a presidential visit, residents of Dashoguz were ordered to paint their houses white and roofs green at their own cost, and to landscape the area around the local airport. The same month, a decree was signed by Berdymukhammedov ordering government ministries to plant 3 million trees in 2013 to transform the country into a “blooming garden and further enrich its beautiful nature in the era of power and happiness.” It fell upon 465,000 public-sector employees, including those working at schools and universities in the country to take a day off work and spend the day planting the 755,000 trees. The project was initiated under late President Saparmurat Niyazov (whose cult of personality apparatus Berdymukhammedov has inherited and ‘enhanced’), who established the project in an attempt to tackle desertification. The regime’s emphasis on physical labour as a work of national servitude reinforces the master-servant binary inherent in its operations.
The state’s economy is almost equally antiquated, largely resembling the state controlled Soviet model. Nonetheless, back in November of last year, the government announced it would introduce a privatization programme, raising eyebrows since the majority of its assets are state controlled. After limited activity in the privatization field, on March 9, a food-production plant, a shopping centre and one chain of auto-repair shops in Ashgabat were put up for sale as part of the programme, which is expected to continue until 2016. “Our privatization programme is just in line with our plans of gradual transition to a market economy," said Berdymukhamedov, though it seems highly unlikely that any oil and gas companies would be subject to privatization. In other attempts to modernize the nation, the country now plans to introduce international accounting standards next year and hopes to join the World Trade Organization, which President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov says will bring “real dividends in economic success.”
The U.S. has welcomed the state’s attempts to join the WTO and there is evidence generally that relations between the two state are strong. Washington seems to be optimistic of warming relations with Turkmenistan. At the third annual Turkic American Alliance meeting held in Washington on March 12 – 13, entitled “Energy, Trade and Development,” US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake said that, ”relations between the United States and Turkmenistan have never been stronger.” Washington is hoping to keep ties with Turkmenistan (and indeed all the other Central Asian states) strong as it prepares for a safe exit from Afghanistan next year. Relations with Russia however, are certainly less warm. Whilst there has been cooperation between Moscow and Ashgabat on the subject of ecological preservation in the Caspian area, tensions are rising over energy exports.
Turkmenistan’s burgeoning relationship with Ukraine is a particularly sore spot. Ukraine is disgruntled with its energy agreement with Russia, which involves increasingly costly gas imports, and is seeking a more favorable deal with Ashgabat, to Moscow’s discomfort. Turkmenistan’s energy resources are frequently employed as a means of gaining strategic power and the country is making attempts to secure lucrative deals with energy-hungry Asia. It is planning a new pipeline to China and to Iran, also an on-off-on pipeline across Afghanistan to Pakistan and eventually India, and hopes to triple gas production potential to 250 billion cubic meters a year by 2030. It will start production at the world's second-largest gas field, Galkynysh, in upcoming months in an attempt to achieve this goal.
Turkmenistan has recently made a number of attempts to asserts its standing at least within the near abroad. On March 20 in Ashgabat, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to construct a 400km railway line connecting the three states. Building work will begin in Turkmenistan in July. In addition, this year Turkmenistan capitalised upon the celebrations of Novruz Bairam, the spring holiday celebrated by most parts of the Turkic world, to make the capital a host city for a plethora of heads of state. Among them was Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Pakistan’s Asif Ali Zardari, Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, Afghanistan’s Hamid Karzai, the President of the Russian Republic of Tatarstan, Rustam Minnikhamov, Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, Kasymjomart Tokayev, Turkey’s Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz and members of delegations from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The event provides an opportunity for the president to enjoy bilateral sideline talks with all the above, and offer the kind of histrionics for which he has become famous, including traditional performances and equestrian shows in the valley of Akhai.
Many rights observers have noted with dismay that the regime’s energy stocks and its geo-political strategizing seems to immunize it from the level of criticism it should face for its abuses of rights and the political opposition. It is however one of the least accessible nations on earth –since centuries ago it provided a stretch of the Silk Road, it is not now ‘on the way to’ anywhere else- its frontiers with Iran and Afghanistan are both in obscure parts of those nations, which is one reason that Russia cannot ‘lean on it’ as it can and does with many, perhaps most other FSU states.
The country’s strong economic growth, fuelled by petrodollars, has contributed to its confidence and the level of impunity with which the self-serving president, who must now be one of the richest men in the world, exercises his authority.
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| Countries: Kazakstan |
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Posted on Friday, April 26, 2013 - 02:45 PM |
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Summary: Proud of its record in non-proliferation, Kazakhstan has recently enjoyed hosting nuclear talks between Iran and six world powers on the future of the latter's highly controversial nuclear regime. Kazakhstan, this oil rich nation of nearly 17 million people has been a strong advocate of nuclear probity since over twenty years ago it voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The state has used this to cement a reputation for itself as a responsible nation and has enjoyed the accompanying diplomatic benefits. Its reputation in terms of rights abuses of its own citizens is however far less positive. The regime led for the past 22 years by veteran iron man Nursultan Nazarbayev, the communist boss before the USSR broke up, is known for glaring rights abuses.
To start with the issue of Iran's nuclear talks, talks between the six nations: the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain, Germany and Iran started on April 5 in Almaty. The six world powers have been seeking a concrete response from Iran in response to their February offer of relaxing sanctions if Tehran put a halt to its most controversial nuclear work. Foreign Minister Erlan Idrissov of Kazakhstan has not attempted to overplay its role as host nation, stating, “To put it in a nutshell, our role is very simple and very modest. We have to prepare a nice coffee and nice tea, for the parties to be happy and have a really good atmosphere to work and focus on the issues of substance.”
Nonetheless, the state has received lavish praise for doing so with aplomb. Whilst the negotiations yielded little in the way of actual progress, a united front was presented when praising the state’s hosting efforts. “Let me, once again, convey our gratitude to the government of Kazakhstan for their truly flawless performance in hosting these talks,” a senior United States official commented.
It is some sign not only of Kazakhstan's responsible attitude towards nuclear but also of its diplomatic skill. It had been difficult to find a location that would be palatable for the Iranian party. Kazakhstan, however, fits Iran’s requirements for a venue, as a country that recognizes Iran’s right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes and that has not directly levelled any sanctions against Iran. Although it has complied with UN sanctions, the state has not launched any embargo of its own against the regime. Erlan Idrissov conceded contentedly that his country was enjoying the attention: “We are happy that Kazakhstan has become at least one point on which all parties agree 100 per cent.”
However, some Kazakh citizens are less than happy with Kazakhstan's nuclear policies. In the town of Ust-Kamenogorsk, in the eastern part of the country, the government's intention of hosting a nuclear fuel bank under UN control at the Ulba metallurgy plant has angered local residents. Denis Danielevsky who edits a local independent newspaper has attempted to draw attention to the ecological perils of such an endeavour. "The air quality is very bad here and any project with the word nuclear causes a negative reaction among people," he has stated. The plant is already the biggest uranium production factory in Kazakhstan. The chairman of Kazakhstan's atomic energy committee Temir Zhantikin has defended the plans. "Taking into account that the plant will be operating under international standards the impact on the environment and public health will be practically zero," he says. "The Ulba plant has been working for more than 60 years in this field and they have high standards for nuclear safety and security.”
Whether this is the case or not, the lack of platforms for civil society means that citizens’ considerations receive scant attention from the authorities.
Many would argue that sweeping diplomatic gestures might come at the expense of the citizens themselves. The regime has a notoriously frightening human rights record and has much experience when it comes to stampeding over citizens’ interests. The pertinence of this to the ecological sphere was made shockingly clear in March, when environmental activist Nurlan Oteuliev, who fought to save a forest close to the state’s largest city, Almaty, was shot dead. The mother of the campaigner and member of the Tabighat (Nature) Social Fund believes his death must be connected to his work.
Journalists have been faring particularly badly of late. After a sweeping series of closures in December, the independent press has been struggling to survive in any form. Prison sentences on trumped up charges are a habitual form of repressing those active in the media sphere. Asqar Moldashev, the brother of Daniyar Moldashev, a founder of opposition "Golos Respubliki" (Voice of the Republic) newspaper (now a banned publication) recently received a suspended four-year sentence for illegal possession of a large amount of psychotropic medicine. Moldashev told journalists after his sentence was announced that he had been targeted because of his refusal to cooperate with Kazakhstan’s security services when they attempted to convince him to denounce his brother. In another example, Vadim Kuramshin, a jailed defender of prisoners’ rights has been transferred to the institution he criticized the most. According to his mother, he has now been sent to a maximum-security prison in the northern city of Petropavlovsk where he will face deplorable conditions. Pressure on rights groups is relentless and shows no sign of waning.
Given that Kazakhstan’s neighbouring states are largely culpable of similar forms of rights abuses, there is little pressure from the near abroad to improve its rights record. If anything, Kazakhstan has of late enjoyed improving relations with some of its neighbours. Bilateral relations with Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan, for example, have recently undergone something of a thaw. Relations between the two nations had been tense for some time, principally as the two states vied for dominance within the region (also for the worst human rights reputation) . On March 27, Mr Karimov, who has rumoured to have been ill of late, granted an audience to Nazarbayev’s foreign minister, Erlan Idrissov, in his residence in the capital Tashkent.
Bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China have also in particular flourished. In December, President Nazarbayev visited China and a number of agreements were signed. Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas National Oil and Gas Company and China’s CNPC agreed on the outline of cooperation to expand and jointly operate the Kazakhstan – China oil pipeline. Astana may also favour China as a potential purchaser for a large stake in its biggest oilfield as Beijing could offer loans in return. There was evidence of considerable good will upon Kazakhstan’s part as the state will has declare 2017 a year of Chinese tourism, helping to capitalize economically on strengthening ties. On April 6 of this year Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks with Nazarbayev in the city of Sanya in south China's Hainan Province, cementing the progress already made.
As Kazakhstan continues to charm tis neighbours, many analysts have wondered how it has managed to avoid the kind of international criticism for rights abuses that Moscow for example has not managed to deflect. It appears to be using its responsible nuclear image to mask some of its less glorious achievements. Whilst it may have proven highly cooperative and judicious in this domain, there is concern that attention is not focused al all upon its internal workings. Thankfully in mid-April a motion was made in the European Parliament urging members to vote for a new resolution expressing concern about Kazakhstan’s human rights situation. President Nazarbayev seems oblivious to the level of improvement that is necessary to improving the state’s rights record. At a recent meeting with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, he stated, “We believe that the democracy and freedom that exist in the West, as in Finland, are for us the final goal, and not the start of the path […] We are going along that path.” Many would beg to differ.
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| Countries: Georgia |
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Posted on Friday, April 26, 2013 - 02:43 PM |
Summary: The past months have proved very tense times for Georgia which is experiencing an uneasy period of “cohabitation” between arch rivals Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and President Saakashvili. Many observers have been concerned that the political landscape will descend into ongoing fighting between their two parties in a way that will prove deleterious to the country as a whole.
Since Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition won the parliamentary elections of last October, unseating the ruling United National Movement party of President Mikhail Saakashvili, there have been serious issues regarding the ‘cohabitation’ of the two parties. The viciousness of the race for control of the parliament has made this new period extremely difficult particularly because the President believes that a number of his political allies have been persecuted by the Georgian Dream coalition since they came to power. Matters came to a head on February 8, when the President attempted to give his last annual address in that role (he will leave the presidency in October) and was initially thwarted by protestors. Key issues remain divisive for the two sides, among them the location of the legislature, the prison system, and the methods by which the president can be elected.
The tensions between the rival factions were all too manifest during the run up to the parliamentary elections of last October. The pre-election campaign saw accusations of dirty tricks fly around and many accuse Mikhail Saakashvili of attempting to diminish the opposition by the use of unfair tactics. When billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili's Georgian Dream coalition came to power, they oversaw a wave of arrests of Saakashvili cohorts. Among them was former Interior Minister Bacho Akhalaia, who is accused of overseeing torture in the prison system. Former Energy Minister Aleksandre Khetaguri and former Justice Minister Nika Gvaramia have both been investigated for embezzlement. Saakashvili was quick to argue that these actions constituted a witch hunt and government by recrimination. On November 26, on a visit to Tbilisi, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, warned of the necessity of the two sides attempting to reconcile with one another in order to serve the needs of Georgia's citizens best. Fears began to grow that a political crisis akin to that which racked Ukraine after the Orange Revolution in 2004 could result and this would significantly retard the country's progress.
One of the first bilateral issues to emerge was that of a proposed amnesty for political prisoners. In December, Saakashvili presented a list of convicts he believed should be released. Meanwhile the Georgian Dream coalition suggested a list of 3,500 convicts or possibly up to as many as 5,000 whom they believed should be released or whose sentences should be commuted. This comes amid a wave of concern about conditions in Georgia’s penal system which has been the subject of a recent expose. Georgian Dream argued that a large number of those on their list had been the victims of political persecution under the Saakashvili regime and now should be released. Naturally the president did not agree with some of these choices, and also disputed the usage of the term ‘political prisoner’ because he believed that it tarnishes the image of Georgia as a country, by drawing a comparison with Belarus or other regimes which are known for rights abuses. On January 13, an amnesty was approved for 3000 prisoners. Saakashvili called the amnesty a "mass release of criminals", and warned of serious consequences.
The tensions continued to mount into the New Year. An issue of particular divisiveness was that of a constitutional amendment which would limit the president's right to dissolve the government without parliamentary approval, something which has come perilously close to a reality during this disputatious co-habitation period. Matters come to a head on February 7, when a majority in Georgia's parliament voted to postpone the President’s annual address because of ongoing unresolved constitutional matters. On February 8 he attempted to give his annual address at the Georgian National Library, but hundreds of protestors attempted to prevent him from entering the building. The protestors complained that the President had no legitimacy and accused him of authoritarianism. Saakashvili's colleagues determined that the protest had been masterminded by Bidzina Ivanishvili and his supporters.
The Presdent was thus obliged to give the speech from the presidential palace. In the address, he attempted to calm fears by stating his belief that the dismissal of a government would be catastrophic for the political force that institutes it, as well as the state. He did, however, also outline several points which were a major source of contention with his adversaries from Georgian Dream. He expressed his opposition to the new initiative to cancel direct presidential elections in Georgia. Another point that has frequently reoccurred is the question of moving the seat of the government from Tbilisi to Kutaisi, which Bidzina Ivanishvili staunchly opposes and wishes to block. Those who hold the belief that Saakashvili has autocratic tendencies see the attempts to move the legislature to the West as a means of removing a rallying place for popular discontent and undermining opposition to his rule. Following the President’s speech, three people were detained on accusations of assaulting law makers from his party at the National Library protest.
Following these incidents, however, a sense of reconciliation seemed to descend upon Tbilisi. President Saakashvili expressed his willingness for immediate talks with Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and the government regarding "constitutional changes and other issues affecting the development of the country." He was not alone in the conciliatory gesture. On February 9, Ivanishvili expressed his "willingness" to cooperate with the president "in accordance with the constitution and the rule of law." A one-on-one meeting on March 9 was described by Saakashvili as a ‘positive step’, and only the second of its kind since the elections of last October. On April 19, Saakashvili addressed thousands of supporters in Tbilisi, telling them that he has offered the "hand of friendship" to rival Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanisvhili and his supporters.
One area in which it is clear that there is a sense of unity is with regards to the pro-Western direction of the state. In a bipartisan resolution passed unanimously late on March 8, the legislature affirmed the country's commitment to its European and Euro-Atlantic foreign-policy course. It is also interesting to note the changes to Tbilisi-Moscow relations since the advent of Georgian Dream. Mikhail Saakashvili has been at loggerheads with Vladimir Putin since the five-day war of 2008. Since then diplomatic relations have been almost entirely frozen. In the past six months there have, however, been some signs of progress.
In terms of trade ties, on April 16 it was announced that Moscow would lift the ban on importing a number of Georgian mineral waters, among them the popular Borjomi brand. Since Ivanishvili made a considerable amount of his money in Russia, he had made the re-establishment of ties a priority of his platform. Georgian wine is also a product that business would like to see once again exported in quantity to Russia. On February 6, Ivanishvili spoke of a surprisingly warm reception” by Russian lawmakers at the World Economic Forum in Davos. It was reported that at the forum, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev had a conversation with his Bidzina Ivanishvili, indicating the first direct contact between the governments of both countries in some years. With the Georgian president, whom Putin once threatened to “hang by the balls” relations remain chilly. In February Georgian deputy and Saakashvili ally Givi Targamadze was convicted in Moscow in absentia on the charge of plotting opposition riots, interlinking Saakashvili’s supporters with the domestic enemy. The issue of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia also remain unresolved. Ivanishvili has given no indication that he would change the state’s stance on these controversial sovereignty issues, which will doubtless continue to be a sticking point.
Despite this, Ivanishvili maintains that the Western orientation of Georgia’s approach is unshakeable, and that any change to its pro-NATO, Euro Atlantic-oriented foreign policy would be “unimaginable.” It is fortunate that this policy can be shared on a cross party level, given that there are so few in that category. It is also fortunate that the crisis, cohabitation seemed to be leading to in February, may have been averted. It appears that an olive branch is being held at the moment by both sides. Georgians can only hope that it does not snap.
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Posted on Friday, April 26, 2013 - 02:39 PM |
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Summary: The trial of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who has been arrested on what have been described as trumped up charges, is a hotspot on the political agenda this month. President Putin has continued to offend the opposition, women and gay people. This month also saw the death of journalist Mikhail Beketov. A staunch defender of the Khimki forest, after an attack that left him paralysed five years ago.
The past month in Russia has been characterised by ongoing attacks on civil society and the political opposition. The trial against whistle- blower and opposition leader Alexei Navalny has, in terms of its pivotal nature, drawn some comparisons with the trial against Yukos founder Mikhail Khordokovsky, who has spent the past eight years in a Siberian jail after criticising the Putin regime. Meanwhile charities are feeling the wrath of the new NGO law which asserts that all organisations which receive foreign funding must register with the government as ‘foreign agents’.
To start with the trial of Alexei Navalny; this stalwart opposition leader founded the ‘rospilinfo’ whistleblowing website and coined the term the 'party of crooks and thieves’ to describe United Russia. Whilst for some time his activities continued with the criticism of the authorities, recently their stance has become more punitive. He has been was accused of embezzling $500,000 from a timber firm he was working for in 2009. His trial began on April 17. He and his supporters have argued that the case is quite simply one of political persecution. The investigative committee campaign against Navalny came as no surprise to Kremlin watchers, since he has been an indefatigable Kremlin critic and, to the minds of many, the most likely candidate as a credible opponent to Putin should the opposition gather together and field a candidate. On April 5, Navalny did in fact announce his desire to run for president. The 36-year old lawyer has in the past five years earned himself dozens of enemies from the denizens of United Russia by unveiling numerous examples of corruption. The most recent example would be that of Vladimir Pekhtin, the head of the ethics commission in the State Duma, who resigned after Navalny blogged about his luxury property holdings in Miami Beach. He has come to be the scourge of Russia’s political elite with his frequent exposes of graft.
His arrest came with little shock. “Why does Putin want to jail me? (I have no doubts that he personally has ordered my case),” Navalny asks in an article he penned in the Guardian. He answers: "It seems to me the logic is obvious: he and his circle must guard their power. And to stay in power they have no other mechanism than jailing people – which is what they are doing. I'm not the first and, unfortunately, will not be the last: we must be ready for the fact that they will jail many more people. They've stolen billions, they know people are outraged by this, that millions of people share my attitude towards them and they are protecting themselves."
Shockingly, his accusers have not hidden the fact that an embezzlement case of this scale would not be being dealt with in such a harsh manner were it not for the fact that he has criticized the government. The Investigative Committee's official spokesman Vladimir Markin told the press that Navalny's reputation as a troublemaker has certainly expedited the action against him. This avowal of legal nihilism prompted billionaire-turned-politician Mikhail Prokhorov to point out that "In any law-abiding state, this statement alone would be enough to dismiss the 'Navalny case' and open a case against General Markin himself." That the charges (described by Navalny as "blatantly fabricated”) were acknowledged to be a matter of political prejudice by the man investigating is fairly worrying. Putin himself has made no comments so far on the court proceedings, which were adjourned 40 minutes after it began. The trial has attracted international attention, though it is being held in Kirov, a town north east of Moscow, in order, many say, to draw Navalny away from the popular attention he enjoys in Moscow.
Another incident has been a sober reminder of the fate of some of Putin’s critics. The death in England of oligarch Boris Berezovsky, the exiled Kremlin critic who once controlled a vast financial empire, has raised discussions about the perils of contesting the regime. The last time a prominent Russian national was killed on British soil was when ex-KBG agent Alexander Litvinenko was killed by polonium poisoning in a London restaurant in 2006, in a shocking case that saw relations between Britain and Russia chill considerably. Whilst the official verdict ruled suicide, which some view as credible given that he had recently lost a major court battle against fellow oligarch and one time protégé Roman Abramovich, his daughter suggested it was unlikely that this was the case. Berezovsky's unrelenting criticisms of the Putin regime (though he was once close to the current President) have aroused suspicions that foul play might have been involved. The widow of Alexander Litvinenko, Marina, has expressed her doubts as to the official verdict on the events. Given the murkiness that overshadows a considerable amount of business dealings among the oligarchs, it is uncertain whether a concrete conclusion can be drawn.
Berezovsky and Navalny are two of the numerous Kremlin critics who have proved irksome to the regime. In order to prevent mass disturbances, the proper functioning of civil society and the political opposition is inhibited in every way in Putin’s Russia. The ongoing quashing of NGOs has drawn increasing castigation from the international community. Back in July 2012, the Kremlin introduced a law that would require NGOs to register as foreign agents (in other words ‘spies’) if they receive any funding from abroad, which the majority of them do. The following months have seen a number of raids on NGO headquarters, where staff have been demanded to provide details of their financial records. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been among those targeted. Election watchdog Golos is now facing fines of up to $16,000 with a possible personal fine of $10,000 for its chief, though the organization claims that they never received any grants.
Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe’s human rights envoy, has said that the new law impelling NGOs to register as foreign agents is having ‘a chilling effect.‘ The U.S. described the latest wave of pressure on NGOs as a ‘witch hunt’. When Vladimir Putin visited Germany for talks with Angela Merkel on April 8, he was greeted with several hundred protestors rallying against the law. Merkel herself chimed in, calling on Putin to allow Russia to have an ‘active civil society’ and to give NGOs ‘a good chance’. In terms of other international critics, Mark Knopfler of the group ‘Dire Straits’ cancelled his two Moscow concerts in protest against it. Putin has recently announced that he will channel the equivalent of $75 million this year towards socially oriented, Russia-based NGOs but many fear that these funds will simply be directed towards organisations which toe, if not simply reinforce, the Kremlin line.
Civil society was also recently rocked by the news of the death of former journalist Mikhail Beketov, who was beaten up viciously in 2008, for reporting on the imminent destruction of the Khimki forest. The forest was subject of a tussle between local residents and the authorities who wished to build the Moscow-St Petersburg motorway through the area, which is considered of special natural interest. Beketov was the editor of Khimkinskaya Pravda, in which he often exposed the corruptions of the local administration. In 2008, after a series of death threats, he was beaten into a coma and was left permanently brain damaged. On April 8 of this year he died after choking on a piece of food. Journalists who gathered to mourn his passing at Moscow’s House of Journalists said that he was "irreplaceable”. Many noted grimly that attacks upon and the murder of journalists is an unavoidable reality of operating in Russia. In another reminder of this fact, on April 18, investigators issued a statement saying that their work in gathering evidence against the five suspects in the 2006(!) assassination of Anna Politkovskaya has been completed and the case would be brought to court. The fat that no one has as of yet been brought to justice for her murder remains an indictment of Russia’s failure to protect members of the press.
The Khimki forest cause has been taken up by other brave activists, among them Yevgenia Chirikova who spoke at Beketov’s funeral. She has won the Goldman Environmental Prize for her unrelenting activism. She too has had her share of problems since plunging into Khimki preservation, including threats that her children would be taken into care. Those who denounce the de-regulation and impunity with which businesses and the authorities use Russian soil are frequent victims of attacks. Citizens who have complained about pollution at Lake Baikal, the world’s deepest and oldest lake, that is host to a pollution-spewing paper mill owned by Oleg Deripaska, have seen their concerns dismissed. The Sochi Olympics, which has been in the headlines recently due to delays, mismanagement, accusations of using poorly paid migrant labourers, had also generated numerous concerns about the disrespect done towards the area's natural beauty (an asset, ironically enough which has been used to attract people to the games which will held next year.) Greenpeace has consistently noted that the authorities have provoked serious ecological damage to sites of exceptional natural importance. The Grushevy mountain ridge, for example, would have been subject to major construction work unless pressure from UNESCO saw the Krenlin back down.
Another worrying tendency that has reared its head in the past month is that of the increasing interweaving of church and state. The intervention of the Orthodox Church and its leader Patriarch Kirill in public and political life has seen traditional values reinforced to a worrying degree. The ***** Riot case perhaps best typifies this trend. Three members of the radical feminist anti-Putin band were arrested for hooliganism after performing a ‘punk prayer’ in Moscow’s Christ the Saviour cathedral in February 20123, but have vowed to continue with their political activism. The incident has seen the Orthodox Church erupt with a barrage of comments that would prove unpalatable for all those who believe in equal rights for women, a key aspect of free and functioning democracy. The Patriarch's most recent tirade was against feminism in general.
In speech made on April 9, he called feminism a “very dangerous” phenomenon. He added that women should be "always directed to the inside, towards her children and her home," and claimed that, “the majority of feminist leaders are unmarried women who have no understanding of the importance of family life."
These criticisms have not stymied the activities of committed feminist activists. Vladimir Putin was recently accosted by a bare-breasted activist from the group Femen, upon his visit to Hanover to meet Angela Merkel. His response was both patronizing and odious. “I liked it,” he said, according to the RIA Novosti news agency. “Thank the Ukrainian girls for helping promote the fair... I didn’t really hear what they were yelling because the security guards were so tough. Those big guys manhandling the girls. I think this is wrong, they could have been more gentle.” Gay rights are even worse observed in Putin's Russia. The gay propaganda ban, which would criminalize all manifestations of homosexuality, has raised international outcry. Upon his recent trip to Amsterdam he was greeted by more than 1000 gay rights activists who picketed the building where he and Prime Minister Mark Rutte held talks.
In terms of international relations, suspicion of the West remains a lodestar of Putin’s regime. Relations with the US continue to prove problematic over the Magnitsky sanctions, which Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov has described as ‘unacceptable’ and ‘a blow to bilateral relations’. Following Washington’s publication of the blacklist of Russian officials who are banned from the United States because of their alleged involvement in the death in custody of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, Moscow retaliated with its own list. Eighteen Americans have been banned from entering Russia among them employees of the Bush administration and two former commanders of Guantanamo Bay. Some observers suggested however that the choice of person could have been much more serious, on both sides. It has been noted that the judge who sentenced Russian national Viktor Bout to 25 years in prison for arms trafficking, Shira Scheindlin, was not included on Washington’s list. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama have now agreed to meet two times in upcoming months in order to assure that tensions do not entirely cloud bilateral relations. The Kremlin did acknowledge that the US has sent a ‘positive signal’, in the form of a delegation to Moscow in early April, bringing with them a ‘constructive’ letter from Barack Obama.
Whilst Vladimir Putin may be keen to present a powerful, monolith state to the world, there are indications that beneath the facade there may be cracks. According to a new Levada Center poll, 55% of Russians said they would like to see Putin make an exit in 2018. In addition to this economic woes are lingering on the horizon. Industrial output has shrunk, and a significant slowdown of the economy has been witnessed. Analysts indicate that this trend will continue.
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